Allan v. University of Washington

Washington Supreme Court
997 P.2d 360 (1999)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

To establish standing under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, a challenger must demonstrate a concrete, personal injury that is not speculative. A spouse's community property interest in a university employee's salary is, by itself, insufficient to confer standing to challenge the employer's internal procedural rules where the threat of harm to that interest is remote and hypothetical.

Facts:

Margaret Allan is the wife of University of Washington (UW) Professor Graham Allan.
In 1989, a student filed a sexual harassment claim against Professor Allan.
The UW initiated termination proceedings, but a faculty committee reinstated Professor Allan following a hearing in which Margaret Allan participated under subpoena.
The student subsequently sued the UW, and the parties reached a settlement in 1991.
A term of the settlement required the UW to propose changes to its procedures for faculty disciplinary appeals arising from student complaints.
Before the changes were adopted, Allan's counsel informed the UW Faculty Senate of her belief that the UW must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), including its public comment requirements.
The UW's legal counsel responded that the revisions were exempt from the APA because they concerned an "employment relationship."
In 1994, the UW faculty voted to enact the proposed changes to the adjudicative procedures in the Faculty Code.

Procedural Posture:

Margaret Allan petitioned for a declaratory judgment in Thurston County Superior Court (trial court) to invalidate the University of Washington's new faculty disciplinary procedures.
The UW moved to dismiss Allan's petition for lack of standing, but the trial court denied the motion.
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Allan, ruling the procedures were invalidly adopted.
The UW (appellant) appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, Division Two.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that Allan (appellee at that stage) lacked standing.
Allan (petitioner) then petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review, which was granted.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does the spouse of a university professor have standing under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (RCW 34.05.530) to challenge the university's faculty disciplinary procedures based on a community property interest in the professor's income and the speculative possibility of future involvement in such proceedings?

Opinions:

Majority - Madsen, J.

No, the spouse of a university professor does not have standing under these circumstances because her asserted interest is too speculative and indirect to satisfy the statutory requirements for being an 'aggrieved or adversely affected' person. To have standing under the APA (RCW 34.05.530), a person must meet a three-prong test requiring: (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) that the interest is within the 'zone of interest' the agency was required to consider, and (3) that a favorable judgment would provide redress. Allan fails to demonstrate an injury-in-fact, as her past participation in a hearing does not confer standing to challenge future rule changes, and the possibility of her future participation is purely speculative. Citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the court requires a 'factual showing of perceptible harm,' not a hypothetical injury. Furthermore, Allan's community property interest in her husband's salary does not place her within the zone of interests, as the UW's employment relationship is with Professor Allan individually, not his marital community. The threat to her financial interest is too remote to constitute a concrete injury.

Dissenting - Sanders, J.

Yes, the spouse of a university professor has standing because her community property interest in her husband's employment contract is a concrete interest that places her within the zone of interest protected by the statute. The UW concedes that Professor Allan would have standing, and since his salary is a community asset that Margaret Allan has a right to manage, she possesses the same concrete interest. The majority's attempt to distinguish the employment relationship from the income it generates is an artificial distinction, as the community is entitled to the fruits of labor performed by either spouse. Citing LaHue v. Keystone Inv. Co., a community property interest is sufficient to confer standing. As Allan possesses a concrete interest, the UW's failure to follow required procedures constitutes a 'procedural injury' sufficient for standing, as established in Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies and narrows the scope of standing under Washington's Administrative Procedure Act, particularly for individuals with indirect or derivative interests. By requiring a non-speculative, concrete, and personal harm, the court limits the ability of family members to challenge agency rules that primarily govern an employment relationship. This precedent reinforces a strict interpretation of the 'injury-in-fact' and 'zone of interest' prongs, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to gain standing based on indirect financial stakes or hypothetical future events, thereby protecting agencies from challenges by a wider class of litigants.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Allan v. University of Washington (1999)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"