Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al.
128 S. Ct. 831 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), the United States retains sovereign immunity from claims arising from the detention of property by any federal law enforcement officer, not just those performing customs or excise functions. The phrase "any other law enforcement officer" is to be read broadly and is not limited by the preceding reference to "officer of customs or excise."
Facts:
- Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali was a federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.
- In December 2003, Ali was scheduled for transfer to a federal penitentiary in Inez, Kentucky.
- Prior to his transfer, Ali left two duffle bags containing his personal property with the Atlanta prison's Receiving and Discharge Unit to be inventoried and shipped to the new facility.
- The property included religious items such as two copies of the Qur'an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines, with an estimated total value of $177.
- Upon his arrival at the Kentucky prison, Ali's bags arrived several days later, and he discovered that several of his personal items were missing.
- Staff at the receiving prison informed him that he had been given everything that was sent from the Atlanta facility.
Procedural Posture:
- Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali filed an administrative tort claim with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which denied relief.
- Ali then filed a complaint in the United States District Court, alleging, among other things, a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
- The BOP moved to dismiss, arguing that Ali's claim was barred by the sovereign immunity exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
- The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Ali (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with the government as appellee.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that BOP officers qualify as law enforcement officers under the § 2680(c) exception.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the interpretation of § 2680(c).
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Issue:
Does the Federal Tort Claims Act's sovereign immunity exception for property detained by "any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer" apply to all federal law enforcement officers, regardless of whether they are enforcing customs or excise laws?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
Yes, the exception applies to all federal law enforcement officers. The plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) broadly covers the detention of property by 'any other law enforcement officer,' and this phrase is not limited by the preceding specific reference to customs and excise officers. The court's reasoning is based on a textualist interpretation, emphasizing that the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, as established in precedents like United States v. Gonzales. The court rejected the application of interpretive canons like ejusdem generis, reasoning that the statutory phrase is disjunctive ('officer of customs or excise or any other...') rather than a list of specific items followed by a general term. Furthermore, a 2000 amendment to the statute, which restored the waiver of immunity for certain forfeiture seizures under 'any provision of Federal law,' supports a broad reading, as the amendment would make little sense if the original exception only applied to customs and excise officers.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No, the exception should be limited to law enforcement officers performing customs or excise functions. The majority's purely textual analysis ignores the statute's broader context, which is overwhelmingly focused on revenue, customs, and excise matters. Canons of construction such as ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis ('a word is known by the company it keeps') should apply here, limiting the general phrase 'any other law enforcement officer' to the character of the specific officers mentioned immediately prior. The legislative history of the provision exclusively discusses customs and excise functions, confirming that Congress did not intend to create a sweeping immunity for all federal officers. The majority's reading renders the specific mention of 'officer of customs or excise' superfluous and creates an overly broad exception that undermines the core purpose of the FTCA.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No, the exception should be limited to officers performing customs or excise functions. The meaning of a general word like 'any' is determined by its context, not by its dictionary definition alone. The entire context—including the provision's drafting history, its exclusive focus on customs and excise, and its purpose—makes it clear that Congress intended a narrow scope. The phrase was added to the bill by an official who explained its purpose was to clarify immunity for 'officers of customs or excise,' and the British law it was based on was similarly limited. To interpret this phrase as granting broad immunity to over 100,000 federal law enforcement officers is to assume Congress would 'hide elephants in mouseholes' by enacting a major policy change in an obscure, tacked-on phrase.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, prioritizing the plain, expansive meaning of words like 'any' over contextual analysis and traditional canons of construction like ejusdem generis. It significantly broadens the scope of federal sovereign immunity under the FTCA's law enforcement exception, shielding the government from liability for property lost or damaged by any federal officer during its detention. The ruling curtails a judicial remedy for such claims, forcing individuals to rely on administrative processes which may be less robust. Future litigation over statutory interpretation will likely cite this case to argue against limiting broad catchall phrases based on preceding specific terms, especially when the terms are linked by a disjunction like 'or'.
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