Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
602 U.S. 1 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
To prevail on a racial gerrymandering claim where race and partisan preference are highly correlated, plaintiffs must carry the demanding burden of disentangling race from politics and proving that race, not partisanship, was the predominant motivating factor in drawing district lines, overcoming a presumption of legislative good faith and providing adequate alternative maps.
Facts:
- Following the 2020 census, South Carolina was required to redraw its congressional district maps due to population shifts, with District 1 being overpopulated by 87,689 residents and District 6 underpopulated by 84,741 residents.
- The State Senate subcommittee responsible for drawing the new map issued guidance explaining that traditional districting principles would guide the process, along with the goal of creating a stronger Republican tilt in District 1.
- Will Roberts, a nonpartisan staffer with 20 years of experience, drew the new maps, relying on political data from the 2020 Presidential election and input from various lawmakers.
- The eventual map, known as the Enacted Plan, unified Beaufort and Berkeley Counties within District 1, put more of Dorchester County in District 1, and moved a series of precincts in Charleston from District 1 to District 6 to address population imbalances and increase District 1's Republican advantage.
- The precincts moved out of District 1 in Charleston were predominantly Black and had a 58.8% Democratic vote share, leading to a significant racial disparity in the revised district.
- The Enacted Plan achieved the legislature's political goal by increasing District 1's projected Republican vote share by 1.36% to 54.39%, while its Black voting-age population (BVAP) rose slightly from 16.56% to 16.72%.
- The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and District 1 voter Taiwan Scott (the Challengers) sued, alleging that District 1 was racially gerrymandered and unlawfully diluted the electoral power of the State's Black voters.
Procedural Posture:
- The Challengers initially sued South Carolina in federal district court to contest the 2011 map based on the 2020 census, alleging a violation of the one person, one vote requirement.
- After South Carolina passed the Enacted Plan, the Challengers amended their complaint to attack the new map.
- A three-judge District Court rejected the Challengers' claims for Districts 2 and 5 but held that South Carolina drew District 1 with a 17% BVAP 'target,' violating the Equal Protection Clause, and unlawfully diluted the Black vote.
- The District Court permanently enjoined South Carolina from conducting elections in District 1 until it approved a new map.
- South Carolina appealed the District Court's judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Did the District Court clearly err in finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's Congressional District 1, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, when the State asserted a partisan gerrymandering defense and plaintiffs provided no direct evidence or adequate alternative maps?
Opinions:
Majority - Alito, J.
Yes, the District Court's finding that race predominated in the design of District 1 in the Enacted Plan was clearly erroneous. The Challengers failed to meet the demanding burden of showing that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations, and the District Court did not properly disentangle race from politics. The Court emphasized the presumption of legislative good faith, requiring courts to draw inferences in the legislature's favor when evidence plausibly supports multiple conclusions. The Challengers offered no direct evidence, and their circumstantial evidence was very weak, relying on flawed expert reports that ignored traditional districting criteria and partisan interests. The District Court's inferences regarding the constant BVAP, the movement of more voters than necessary, county splits, and mapmakers viewing racial data could all be explained by the State's partisan goal. Furthermore, the District Court erred by failing to draw an adverse inference against the Challengers for not providing an adequate alternative map that achieved the State's political objectives with greater racial balance, despite the ease of producing such a map. The Court also found the District Court erred in conflating the racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims, as vote dilution requires showing a purposeful device to minimize minority voting potential, not merely predominant use of race.
Concurring - Thomas, J.
Yes, the judgment below must be reversed. Justice Thomas joined all but Part III-C of the majority opinion, finding that the Court's searching review of expert reports exceeded the proper scope of clear-error review, though the analysis in Parts III-B (presumption of good faith) and III-D (failure to produce alternative map) was sufficient for reversal. Justice Thomas reiterated his view that the Court has no power to decide racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims because they are nonjusticiable political questions. He argued that there are no judicially manageable standards for resolving such claims and that the Constitution commits these issues exclusively to the political branches (Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1). He criticized the Court's doctrines for indulging in race-based reasoning inimical to a colorblind Constitution, asserting that the 'predominance' standard is constitutionally suspect, and vote dilution claims lead to racial stereotyping by assuming uniform political preferences for minority groups. He also contended that the judicial remedy of drawing new maps exceeds traditional equitable powers.
Dissenting - Kagan, J.
No, the District Court did not clearly err, and the majority's reversal is deeply flawed. Justice Kagan argued that the majority misapplies the clear-error standard by effectively inverting it, deferring to the State's assertions rather than the District Court's plausible findings. She criticized the majority's creation of a new, highly impactful 'adverse inference' rule for plaintiffs who do not submit alternative maps, directly contradicting Cooper v. Harris. The dissent highlighted the District Court's comprehensive fact-finding, including extensive testimony and expert analysis. It argued that State mapmaker Will Roberts, a 'veteran consumer of racial data,' constantly had BVAP data visible on his screen, and that racial data was a better predictor of future votes than the partisan data used by the State. The District Court's finding that the uncanny stability of District 1's BVAP (shifting by only 0.1%) after substantial population movement was evidence of a racial 'target' was plausible. The dissent defended the Challengers' expert reports against the majority's 'armchair statistician' criticisms, arguing that geographical constraints were not significant given District 1's narrow shape and that the State failed to offer counter-analyses. The dissent concluded that the majority's decision stacks the deck against challengers of racial gerrymanders, sending a harmful message to state legislators that such practices will be easy to cover up.
Analysis:
This case significantly raises the bar for plaintiffs challenging racial gerrymandering, particularly when a state claims a partisan motive. By emphasizing a stringent clear-error review that seems to favor the legislature's 'plausible' explanations and by introducing a strong adverse inference for the absence of an 'alternative map,' the Court makes disentangling race and politics exceptionally difficult. The ruling may lead to fewer successful racial gerrymandering claims, reinforcing the idea that federal courts should largely avoid redistricting disputes unless there's direct evidence of racial intent or overtly bizarre district shapes. It reiterates the Court's recent reluctance to intervene in election mapping on constitutional grounds, especially in areas where race and politics are highly correlated.
