The $11,000 the Spitter has to pay for spitting in the Spit-on's face is not too much. The court said that spitting like that is one of the worst insults and could easily make someone want to fight back. So, the law needs to make people pay a lot of money (called 'punishment money') to protect people from such awful acts and to stop them from trying to get even with violence. Juries are allowed to give this punishment money when someone acts in a really mean, willful, or outrageous way. The court found that the Spitter's act was completely mean-spirited and intentional, done just to be insulting. Since the Spitter seemed to be a rich person, the court felt that this amount of money wasn't too high for such a deliberately mean act, and they found nothing wrong with how the first trial handled it.

No, the amount of money wasn't too much. I think spitting in someone's face in the courtroom is one of the meanest, most insulting things you can do, and it happened in a very special place - the courtroom, which is like a temple of justice. People should be able to go to court without worrying about being insulted so badly, especially right in front of the judges. The law should punish people who do such terrible things in courtrooms by making them pay a lot of money, so that everyone respects the court and no one feels like they need to fight to stick up for themselves. Spitting in the other man's face was just to be mean and insulting, and doing it in the courtroom made it even worse. The spitter has a lot of money, and we don't think making him pay this much was too extreme for ruining the peaceful, respectful atmosphere of the courtroom.

<opinion type="majority"> <author id="b555-13" pgmap="555">Mr. Justice Sheldon</author> delivered the opinion of the Court: The ground mainly relied on for the reversal of the judgment in this case is, that the damages are excessive, being 11000. The case presented is this: There was a trial of an action of trespass between the parties, wherein the appellee was defendant, in the circuit court of Jasper county. At the close of the trial the court adjourned, and, immediately upon the adjournment, in the court room, in the presence of a large number of persons, the appellant deliberately spat in the face of the appellee. So long as damages are allowable in any civil case, by way of punishment or for the sake of example, the present, of all cases, would seem to be a most fit one for the award of such damages. The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only means of redress. Suitors, in the assertion of their rights, should be allowed approach to the temple of justice without incurring there exposure to such disgraceful indignities, in the very presence of its ministers. It is customary to instruct'juries that they may give vindictive damages where there are circumstances of malice, wilfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong complained of. The act in question was wholly made up of such qualities. It was one of pure malignity, done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity. An exasperated suitor has indulged the gratification of his malignant feelings in this despicable mode. The act was the very refinement of malice. The defendant appears to be'a man of wealth; we can not say that he has been made to pay too dearly for the indulgence. We have carefully looked into the instructions given and refused, and do not perceive any substantial error in respect to them. The judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. </opinion>

The award of $11,000 in damages for the act of spitting in the appellee's face is not excessive. The Court found the appellant's act to be one of "the greatest indignity," "highly provocative of retaliation by force," and thus warranted "liberal damages" to afford substantial protection and preserve "public tranquillity" by avoiding the necessity of personal violence. The Court reiterated that juries are customarily instructed to give "vindictive damages" where there are circumstances of malice, wilfulness, wantonness, outrage, and indignity. The appellant's act was described as "wholly made up of such qualities," "pure malignity," and "the very refinement of malice," done for the mere purpose of insult. Considering the appellant's wealth, the Court concluded that the amount was not too high for such an indulgence of malicious feelings and perceived no substantial error in the jury instructions or judgment.

No, the damages are not excessive. The act of spitting in the appellee's face in the courtroom was one of the greatest indignity and highly provocative. Suitors must be allowed to approach the temple of justice without incurring there exposure to such disgraceful indignities, in the very presence of its ministers. The law must afford substantial protection against such courtroom outrages through liberal damages to preserve public tranquillity and prevent resort to personal violence as redress. This act was pure malignity, done solely for insult and indignity in the sacred space of the courtroom. Given the appellant's wealth and the egregious nature of desecrating judicial proceedings, he has not been made to pay too dearly. The judgment is affirmed.

Alcorn v. Mitchell

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