No, on both questions. A company can't get out of paying lost wages just by saying it had 'good intentions.' The purpose of the law is to fix the harm done to workers, not to punish a company for being bad. If people lost money because of illegal discrimination, they should be paid back. Also, the company's hiring tests are not okay. Their study trying to prove the tests were fair was deeply flawed. To be fair, a test that has a negative effect on minorities must be proven to be directly related to the job by following professional guidelines, like those from the government's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

I agree completely. When the case goes back to the lower court, the company should have a very hard time proving it was harmed because the workers asked for backpay late. All the information needed to figure out lost wages is in the company's own files, so they can't claim evidence is missing.

I agree, but it's important that judges have flexibility on backpay. If paying lost wages became automatic like a penalty, then companies might have a right to a jury trial, which would complicate these cases. Also, the fact that the workers waited five years to ask for money is a big deal that the trial judge should consider.

I agree with the result, but I think a company's 'good faith' could be a reason to deny backpay in some situations, like if a state law forced them to do something that federal law forbids. I also worry about forcing companies to follow the EEOC's testing rules perfectly. It might make them give up on objective tests and just hire by quotas.

I disagree with the majority's conclusion. The company tried in good faith to follow the law as it was being developed, and the workers waited five years to ask for money. The trial judge was right to deny backpay. Also, the Court is treating the EEOC's guidelines like law, but they're just guidelines. The trial judge listened to the experts and decided the tests were fair enough, and we should respect that decision.

Yes, the workers should get paid for the money they lost because of discrimination, to make them as whole as possible, unless there's a strong reason against it. The lower court was wrong to deny the money based on the company's intentions and timing issues. The company didn't properly show that its job tests were fair, necessary, and the least discriminatory option.

Agrees with the main opinion that the workers should usually get their lost wages unless there are special circumstances. Says the lower court needs to clearly explain its reasons if it still decides not to give the backpay.

Agrees with the main opinion. Talks about how backpay is a fairness issue and the lower court has flexibility in deciding. Points out things the lower court can think about when reconsidering backpay.

Agrees with the end result but not all the reasons given by the main opinion. Thinks the company's intentions could matter for backpay. Also unsure about making the company strictly follow the government's test rules.

Agrees courts can choose about backpay but disagrees with the main opinion's view of this case. Would trust the lower court's findings that the company didn't mean harm and that the tests were fair for the jobs.

Machinists was a decision under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but we have often observed that the NLRA was the model for Title VII's remedial provisions, and have found cases interpreting the former persuasive in construing the latter.

Referring again to Albemarle, the Court then stated that district courts have "not merely the power but the duty [under Title VII] to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar likely discrimination in the future." Id

The purpose of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination

A plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing "that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants."

In Albemarle we emphasized that a "central" purpose of Title VII is "making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."

Back pay "should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination,"

Finally, if the employer does establish that his test is job-related, the complaining party still may prevail if he can show that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's interest in `efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'"

As the court has repeatedly emphasized in this litigation, "the purpose of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination," and to place such persons, "as near as may be, in the situation [they] would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed."

In exercising these powers, courts are to be guided by complementary aims: discouraging employers from discrimination, and compensating discrimination's victims as fully as possible.

Thus, "the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that there was another available method of evaluation which was equally valid and less discriminatory that the employer refused to use." Bryant, 200 F. 3d at 1094

No. A district court may not deny backpay simply because an employer acted in good faith, as the purpose of backpay is to make the victim whole, not to punish the employer. Furthermore, employment tests with a discriminatory impact are not 'job related' unless the employer proves, through professionally acceptable methods consistent with EEOC guidelines, that the tests have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. The primary objectives of Title VII are prophylactic: to achieve equality of employment opportunities and make victims of discrimination whole. Denying backpay for any reason that does not frustrate these central purposes is an abuse of discretion. The absence of bad faith is not a sufficient reason. Regarding the tests, following Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the employer bears the burden of proving job relatedness. The EEOC's Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures are entitled to great deference. Albemarle's validation study was found to be materially defective because: (1) it did not validate the tests for all jobs for which they were required; (2) it relied on subjective and vague supervisor rankings without a job analysis; (3) it focused on employees in upper-level jobs, not the entry-level positions for which the tests were a screen; and (4) it was not validated for minority employees.

Yes, I agree with the Court's opinion and write to emphasize that on remand, the employer should face a high bar in proving prejudice from the plaintiffs' delay in claiming backpay. The doctrine of laches is particularly difficult to establish in these cases because the necessary data for calculating backpay (personnel records, pay scales) is within the employer's control. A defendant's speculation that they 'might have chosen to exercise unusual zeal' in litigation had they known about the backpay claim earlier is not an adequate basis to deny compensatory relief to the victims.

Yes, I join the Court's opinion, but write to highlight that treating backpay as an equitable remedy subject to the court's discretion is crucial to avoiding the Seventh Amendment question of a right to a jury trial, which would arise if backpay were treated as automatic damages. While good faith alone is not a sufficient defense, a combination of factors, including reasonable conduct by the employer and prejudicial delay by the plaintiffs, should be open for consideration by the district court in exercising its equitable discretion. The plaintiffs' reversal on seeking classwide backpay after five years is a significant factor the district court must weigh on remand.

I concur only in the judgment. I disagree that an employer's good faith can never be a sufficient reason to deny backpay, especially in cases where an employer is caught between violating Title VII and violating a state's 'female protective' statute. Additionally, I cannot join in the Court's apparent requirement of absolute compliance with EEOC Guidelines. Slavish adherence to these guidelines, which are not formal regulations, may leave employers with no choice but to engage in subjective quota systems, which is contrary to the intent of Title VII.

I agree that backpay is a discretionary remedy but dissent from the Court's application. Given Albemarle's good faith efforts to comply with a developing area of law and the plaintiffs' five-year delay in seeking backpay, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying that remedy. I also dissent from the Court's 'wooden application' of the EEOC testing guidelines. These are not regulations, and the District Court's factual findings, which resolved expert conflicts in favor of Albemarle's study, were not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed or at least reconsidered with proper deference.

Backpay should be awarded to make victims of discrimination whole, unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. The District Court erred in denying backpay based on lack of bad faith and potential prejudice. The employer's testing program was not adequately shown to be job related as required under Title VII, and the employer must also consider less discriminatory alternatives that would achieve the same business needs because.

Agrees with the majority that backpay should ordinarily be awarded absent special circumstances. Emphasizes that the District Court should carefully articulate its reasons if it declines to award backpay on remand.

Joins the majority opinion. Discusses the equitable nature of the backpay remedy and the discretion it affords to district courts. Notes factors the district court may consider on remand in determining whether to award backpay.

Concurs in the judgment but does not agree with all of the majority's reasoning. Believes an employer's good faith may be relevant to the backpay determination. Also expresses reservations about requiring absolute compliance with EEOC testing guidelines.

Concurs regarding the discretionary nature of backpay awards but dissents from the majority's application to the facts here. Would defer to the District Court's findings on the employer's lack of bad faith and the job-relatedness of the tests.

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody

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