Yes. A suspended sentence is a real threat of jail time, and that's serious enough that the person needs a lawyer. If Shelton messes up his probation, he goes to jail for the original crime he was convicted of without a lawyer's help. That's not fair because the trial where he was found guilty wasn't properly tested by a legal expert. The threat of future jail time is too serious to face without legal representation.

No. The rule has always been that you only get a free lawyer if you are *actually* going to jail right after the trial. A suspended sentence is just a threat, not 'actual imprisonment.' The Constitution doesn't require a free lawyer for just the *possibility* of going to jail later. The court shouldn't get involved until and unless the state actually tries to put Shelton behind bars.

Yes, the big court said you do need a lawyer. If there's a chance you could go to jail for a crime, you should have a lawyer when the court decides if you're guilty. It doesn't matter if the jail time is paused. If you end up in jail, it's because of the original crime, not because you broke probation rules later. It's not fair to decide someone is guilty without a lawyer and then send them to jail for it later.

No, some judges didn't agree. They said you only need a lawyer if you're actually going to jail right away. If jail is just a possibility for later, that's not enough. They think the court is making a mistake by saying states have to give lawyers in all these extra situations now.

—"a suspended sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution of the crime charged."

—the Court stated that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel.

The Court explained that "[a] suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense."

—the US Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel applies to a defendant who receives a suspended sentence.

—stating that the court's inquiry for determining whether an indigent defendant facing imposition of a suspended jail sentence had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a probation violation hearing focuses on the stage of the proceedings where a defendant's "guilt was adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined" in order to …

No defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment or probation if the right to counsel was not afforded at trial.

Although the right to counsel does not always extend to defendants charged with misdemeanor crimes, it does extend to a defendant where a suspended jail sentence could be revoked, resulting in incarceration.

The Supreme Court declined to consider whether a probationer with a suspended imprisonment sentence imposed without the assistance of counsel could be sent to jail following a contempt proceeding where the probationer received the assistance of counsel.

The United States Supreme Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense*** unless he was represented by counsel***."

The trial court "at no time offered [the defendant] assistance of counsel at state expense," and after representing himself, the defendant was convicted of third-degree assault and sentenced to thirty days in jail, "which the trial court immediately suspended, placing [the defendant] on probation for two years."

Yes. A suspended sentence that may result in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the right to counsel. The Court reasoned that a suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. If a defendant's probation is later revoked, they are incarcerated for the underlying offense, not the probation violation. Therefore, an uncounseled conviction that results in a suspended sentence 'end[s] up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty,' which is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Argersinger v. Hamlin and Scott v. Illinois, forbids. The Court distinguished this from sentence enhancement cases like Nichols v. United States, because here, the potential imprisonment is for the original uncounseled misdemeanor itself, not a subsequent counseled felony. A subsequent probation revocation hearing, which in Alabama does not permit challenging the original conviction, cannot cure the initial Sixth Amendment violation.

No. The imposition of a suspended sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment because it does not result in an 'actual imprisonment' and therefore does not deprive a defendant of personal liberty. The dissent argues that the Court's long-standing precedent, from Argersinger to Scott, draws a bright line at 'actual imprisonment' as the trigger for the right to appointed counsel. A suspended sentence is merely a 'threat of imprisonment.' The constitutional question of whether the defendant is entitled to counsel only arises if and when the state seeks to activate the sentence and imprison the defendant. The majority's decision is an advisory opinion on a future contingency and imposes a large, new, and unnecessary financial burden on the states.

Yes. The Court holds that a suspended sentence that may result in actual imprisonment is a term of imprisonment for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment requires the assistance of counsel in these cases. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. The uncounseled conviction at that point results in imprisonment; it ends up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty. This is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Argersinger and Scott, does not allow. The Court rejects the argument that the provision of counsel at the probation revocation stage could compensate for the absence of counsel at the trial itself, because the revocation hearing does not address the key Sixth Amendment issue of whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration.

No. Justice Scalia argues that the imposition of a suspended or conditional sentence does not result in the defendant's loss of personal liberty and so does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The defendant is not deprived of liberty unless the sentence is later activated upon a violation of probation conditions. The question of whether the procedures attending such activation comply with the Constitution is not before the Court in this case. The Court improperly issues an advisory opinion on that question. Justice Scalia criticizes the Court for unduly limiting the options available to the States, such as providing counsel at a later probation revocation hearing rather than at the initial trial.

Alabama v. Shelton

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Issue:

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