Akins v. Texas
1945 U.S. LEXIS 1976, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 325 U.S. 398 (1945)
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Rule of Law:
The mere fact of inequality in the number of jurors of a particular race selected for a single grand jury does not, in itself, prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A defendant must prove that jury commissioners acted with a purposeful and intentional plan to discriminate, which can be established by systematic exclusion over time or by unequal application of the law.
Facts:
- Akins, a Negro man, was a resident of Dallas County, Texas, where approximately 15.5% of the population was Negro.
- A substantial portion of the Negro population in Dallas County was qualified to serve as grand jurors.
- Prior to the Supreme Court's 1942 decision in Hill v. Texas, no Negro person had ever served on a grand jury in Dallas County.
- Following the Hill decision, the trial court judge instructed the jury commissioners for the January 1943 term not to discriminate against anyone because of their color.
- The three jury commissioners selected a panel of sixteen prospective grand jurors, which included one Negro man.
- The selected Negro man served on the twelve-person grand jury that returned an indictment against Akins for murder.
- During a hearing on a motion to quash the indictment, the commissioners gave conflicting testimony, with some statements indicating they "had no intention of placing more than one negro on the panel," while other statements asserted they were endeavoring to be fair without discriminating against any race.
Procedural Posture:
- Akins was indicted for murder by a grand jury in Dallas County, Texas.
- In the Criminal District Court of Dallas County (the trial court), Akins filed a motion to quash the indictment, alleging racial discrimination in the grand jury's selection.
- The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to quash.
- Following a jury trial, Akins was convicted of murder with malice and sentenced to death.
- Akins, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas, the state's highest court for criminal matters.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Akins then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which the Supreme Court granted.
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Issue:
Does the selection of only one African American for a grand jury panel of sixteen, coupled with testimony from the jury commissioners that they intended to select only one, constitute purposeful and intentional racial discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Reed
No, the selection of one African American juror under these circumstances does not constitute a proven violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The burden is on the defendant to establish purposeful discrimination, and fairness in jury selection has never been held to require proportional representation of races. The mere fact of inequality in the number selected on a single grand jury, without more, does not show discrimination. Here, the evidence of intent was conflicting, and the Court must give great respect to the state court's conclusion that no discrimination occurred. The inclusion of a Negro juror for the first time after a court mandate against exclusion can be viewed as an effort to comply with the Constitution, not to subvert it. The evidence presented was insufficient to overturn the state court's finding and prove a deliberate and intentional limitation based on race.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Murphy
Yes, the commissioners' actions constituted a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Racial limitation is as unconstitutional as racial exclusion, and the commissioners' own testimony provides clear proof of an intentional and deliberate limitation based on race. They candidly admitted they had no intention of placing more than one Negro on the jury. By pre-determining the number of jurors of a particular race, whether one or any other number, the commissioners failed to select jurors without regard to race. This is the very essence of discrimination and violates the petitioner's right to have jurors selected from a cross-section of the community without regard to irrelevant factors like color.
Analysis:
This decision refines the standard for proving racial discrimination in jury selection, distinguishing it from earlier cases that dealt with total, systematic exclusion. By upholding a conviction where commissioners admitted an intent to limit the number of Black jurors to one, the Court placed a high evidentiary burden on defendants alleging discrimination. The ruling suggests that token inclusion can defeat a claim of discrimination, making it more difficult to challenge subtler forms of racial manipulation in jury composition. It underscores the deference federal courts may show to state court findings of fact on the issue of discriminatory intent, requiring very strong evidence to overcome them.
