Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc.
1984 Pa. Super. LEXIS 6208, 483 A.2d 456, 334 Pa. Super. 295 (1984)
Rule of Law:
In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff in a libel action is no longer required to prove special economic damages, as the distinction between 'libel per se' and 'libel per quod' for determining the need for such proof is abolished; all libels are actionable upon proof of 'actual harm,' which includes impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish, and unprivileged publication may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Facts:
- William Agriss was employed by Roadway Express, Inc. as a truck driver since 1976 and was elected a shop steward for Teamsters Local 229 in February 1979.
- On December 21, 1979, Agriss was given a company 'warning letter' by driver foreman Steve Versuk and relay manager Joe Moran, falsely accusing him of 'opening company mail' at the Tannersville terminal.
- Agriss immediately denied the charge to Joe Moran, who refused to withdraw the warning and rejected Agriss's formal protest, which was the only contractual remedial step available.
- While Agriss was on vacation, Roadway driver Joseph Verdier heard stories circulating in the Tannersville terminal's drivers' room and from a Roadway dispatcher that Agriss was going to be fired for looking into company mail.
- Upon Agriss's return to work in early January 1980, several drivers questioned him about the warning letter, and he overheard the charge discussed over the CB radio.
- On January 11, during a heated discussion with management personnel in an office, District Manager Mike Wickham accused Agriss, 'You read my _mail,' in a voice loud enough to be heard by other Roadway employees.
- Over the next year, Agriss continued to receive comments and questions about the warning letter from Roadway workers and union officials.
Procedural Posture:
- William Agriss sued Roadway Express, Inc. for defamation in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas (trial court).
- After Agriss presented his evidence, the trial court entered a compulsory nonsuit, ruling that the evidence failed to prove a cause of action for defamation.
- Agriss filed a petition to remove the nonsuit, which the trial court en banc (a panel of judges from the same court) denied.
- Agriss, the appellant, appealed the denial of his petition to remove the nonsuit to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in granting a compulsory nonsuit in a defamation action by finding that the words 'opening company mail' were not defamatory as a matter of law, that there was insufficient proof of unprivileged publication, that the plaintiff failed to prove 'actual harm,' and by applying a 'libel per se' distinction that required proof of special damages for libel 'per quod'?
Opinions:
Majority - Cirillo, Judge
Yes, the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit because the words 'opening company mail' were capable of a defamatory meaning, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of unprivileged publication by Roadway, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of 'actual harm' as defined by Gertz, and the distinction between 'libel per se' and 'libel per quod' for requiring proof of special damages is abolished in Pennsylvania. The court first determined that the words 'opening company mail,' as applied to Agriss and circulated among his fellow employees, were capable of a defamatory meaning, rejecting the trial court's 'benign reprimand' interpretation. It reasoned that the charge implied dishonesty, lack of integrity, untrustworthiness, and potentially criminal activity, especially considering Agriss's role as a union official and the uncommon nature of such an accusation. Next, the court found sufficient evidence for a jury to infer unprivileged publication by Roadway. While Roadway had an absolute privilege to share the warning letter with specific authorized parties under the collective bargaining agreement, Agriss's testimony and that of Joseph Verdier showed wide, unauthorized dissemination. The court applied the Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. test for circumstantial evidence, concluding that a jury could reasonably infer Roadway was the source of this broader publication, and adopted the principle from Tumbarella v. Kroger Co. that a publisher may be liable for repetitions that are the natural and probable result of an original unprivileged publication. The court also held that Agriss provided sufficient evidence of 'actual harm' under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which includes impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering, not solely out-of-pocket loss, leaving the valuation of such damages to the jury. Finally, and most significantly, the court abolished the distinction between 'libel per se' and 'libel per quod' for purposes of requiring proof of special damages. It noted the historical confusion and inconsistency of these terms, and by adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569, declared that all libels are actionable without proof of special harm. This decision aligns with Pennsylvania's general tendency to follow the Restatement, recognizes the constitutional limits on damages established by Gertz, addresses the lack of rationale for the distinction, and supports the primary function of defamation law—the vindication of reputation—which is not solely dependent on economic loss.
Analysis:
This case significantly reshapes Pennsylvania defamation law by explicitly abolishing the confusing and historically inconsistent 'libel per se' and 'libel per quod' distinction for determining the need to prove special damages. By adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569, the court affirms that all libels are actionable without a showing of special harm, thus simplifying the plaintiff's burden in many cases. The decision also clarifies the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for proving unprivileged publication and broadly interprets 'actual harm' under Gertz, making it easier for plaintiffs to reach a jury on reputational and emotional distress. This ruling lessens the procedural barriers for defamation plaintiffs in Pennsylvania while still acknowledging constitutional limits on damages.
