Adoption of Michael H.
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 898 P.2d 891 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
An unwed biological father's constitutional right to veto a third-party adoption of his child is contingent on him promptly demonstrating a full commitment to his parental responsibilities upon learning of the pregnancy. A failure to act in a timely manner during the pregnancy cannot be cured by subsequent efforts, no matter how substantial, after the child's birth.
Facts:
- In July 1990, Stephanie H. (age 15) learned she was pregnant with a child by Mark K. (age 20).
- After Mark K. suggested an abortion, which Stephanie H. rejected, they agreed to place the child for adoption.
- The couple attended some birthing classes together, but their relationship deteriorated, marked by Mark K.'s violent outbursts and a suicide attempt in October 1990.
- Following his suicide attempt, Mark K. decided he wanted to parent the child but did not clearly communicate this decision to Stephanie H. or the prospective adoptive parents, John and Margaret S.
- In January 1991, Stephanie H. moved to California to live with John and Margaret S.
- The child, Michael H., was born on February 27, 1991, and was immediately placed in the custody of John and Margaret S.
- On March 7, 1991, Mark K., having secured an attorney, formally requested custody of Michael H. for the first time.
Procedural Posture:
- John and Margaret S. filed a petition in superior court (trial court) to terminate Mark K.’s parental rights.
- Mark K. filed a petition to establish his paternity; the two proceedings were consolidated.
- The trial court terminated Mark K.'s parental rights, finding he was not a 'presumed father' and that adoption was in the child's best interest.
- Mark K. (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeal.
- While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Adoption of Kelsey S.
- The Court of Appeal, applying Kelsey S., reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
- On remand, the trial court found that Mark K. had a constitutional right to veto the adoption under the Kelsey S. standard.
- John and Margaret S. (appellants) appealed that finding to the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Mark K.
- The California Supreme Court granted review.
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Issue:
Does an unwed father who fails to promptly demonstrate a full commitment to his parental responsibilities upon learning of the pregnancy, but who makes significant efforts after the child's birth, have a constitutional right to veto a third-party adoption?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J.
No. An unwed father does not have a constitutional right to veto a third-party adoption unless he promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities as soon as he learns of the pregnancy. The court reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded to an unwed father is for the parental relationship he has actively developed, not merely for the biological link. This requires timely action during the pregnancy to allow the mother to make informed decisions about her options (abortion, adoption, or parenting) and to ensure the child's need for stability and permanence from birth is met. The court emphasized that the words 'promptly' and 'timely' from its precedent in Kelsey S. mean that the father must attempt to assume his parental responsibilities as soon as he knows of the pregnancy. Mark K.'s failure to commit during the first several months of the pregnancy and his concealment of his change of heart forfeited any constitutional right to block the adoption, and his later 'impressive' efforts could not revive it.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kennard, J.
Yes. Mark K.'s actions, when viewed in their totality, were sufficient to demonstrate a full commitment to his parental responsibilities under the test established in Kelsey S. The dissent argues that the majority misapplied Kelsey S. by focusing narrowly on Mark K.'s initial ambivalence and ignoring his subsequent, unwavering efforts to assume custody, including providing emotional and financial support during the pregnancy to the extent possible. However, the dissent concurs with the majority's ultimate judgment that the child should remain with the adoptive parents, but on different grounds: the Kelsey S. decision should not have been applied retroactively. Applying it retroactively disrupts settled family relationships that were formed in reliance on the prior law, causing profound harm to the child who, after years of litigation, knows only the adoptive parents.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the constitutional protections for unwed fathers established in Adoption of Kelsey S. by imposing a strict timeliness requirement. It clarifies that a father's commitment must be demonstrated from the moment he learns of the pregnancy, creating a 'use it or lose it' window of opportunity. The ruling prioritizes the state's interest in promoting the finality and stability of adoptions over a biological father's belated attempts to assert parental rights. This precedent makes it much more difficult for an unwed father who is initially hesitant or unsupportive of the pregnancy to later block an adoption, even if his subsequent efforts to parent are substantial.
