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Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Company

United States District Court S. D. New York
252 F. Supp. 140 (1966)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A private business's discriminatory act constitutes state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show the discrimination was done pursuant to a custom that is enforced by the state, such as through a criminal trespass statute.


Facts:

  • During the summer of 1964, the plaintiff, a white school teacher from New York, was a volunteer Freedom School teacher in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
  • On August 14, 1964, the plaintiff and six of her Black students attempted to use the Hattiesburg Public Library but were refused service, after which the Chief of Police closed the library.
  • The group then went to the S. H. Kress & Company (Kress) department store to eat at its lunch counter.
  • A waitress at the Kress lunch counter took the orders of the six Black students but refused to take the plaintiff's order.
  • The plaintiff alleged the waitress stated, 'We have to serve Negroes, but we are not serving whites who come in with them.'
  • Because the plaintiff was not served, the entire group left the store.
  • Shortly after leaving the store, a police officer who the plaintiff had previously seen following her group arrested her for vagrancy.

Procedural Posture:

  • Plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against S. H. Kress & Company.
  • The complaint alleged two counts: (1) deprivation of rights under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) conspiracy with the Hattiesburg police to deprive her of constitutional rights.
  • Following discovery, defendant Kress moved for summary judgment on both counts.
  • Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a third cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.

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Issue:

Does a private business act 'under color of state law' for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it refuses service to a white person in the company of Black people, where a state statute authorizes business owners to refuse service and makes it a criminal trespass for the person to remain after being asked to leave?


Opinions:

Majority - Bonsal, District Judge.

Yes. A private business's discrimination may constitute state action if it is carried on pursuant to a custom enforced by state officials under a state law. The court denied Kress's motion for summary judgment on Count I (deprivation of rights), finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kress acted under 'color of state law.' While mere private discrimination is not state action, Mississippi Code § 2046.5 does more than simply permit a business to choose its customers; it provides a criminal sanction for trespass against any person who refuses to leave when asked. Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, the court reasoned that the implementation of private discrimination through the state’s legal powers, like a trespass statute, could transform the private act into state action. A factual dispute exists as to whether Kress's refusal to serve the plaintiff was based on a state-enforced custom of segregation or a fear of public disturbance, precluding summary judgment. However, the court granted summary judgment for Kress on Count II (conspiracy), finding the plaintiff offered no evidence from which a conspiracy with the police could be inferred. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to add a third count under the Civil Rights Act of 1875, reasoning that the Act's protections for 'inns' and 'places of public amusement' do not extend to a lunch counter.



Analysis:

This decision demonstrates the expansion of the 'state action' doctrine in civil rights law. By connecting a private entity's discriminatory policy to a facially neutral state trespass law, the court provides a pathway for plaintiffs to hold private actors accountable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It shifts the inquiry from whether the state explicitly compels discrimination to whether the state actively enforces it, even if the enforcement mechanism is a general criminal statute. This reasoning forces a factual inquiry into the customs and practices of a community and the role state law plays in upholding them, making it more difficult for private defendants to win dismissal on summary judgment in similar civil rights cases.

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