Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a "custom, or usage, of [a] State" must have the force of law due to the persistent practices of state officials. Additionally, a party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and does not meet this burden if it fails to foreclose all possibilities related to a key factual allegation.
Facts:
- Sandra Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, was teaching at a 'Freedom School' for Black students in Hattiesburg, Mississippi during the summer of 1964.
- On August 14, 1964, Adickes went to the Hattiesburg Public Library with six of her Black students.
- After the librarian refused service to the students and the police ordered the group to leave, they proceeded to the restaurant inside the S. H. Kress & Co. (Kress) department store for lunch.
- Inside the Kress restaurant, a waitress took the orders of the Black students but refused to serve Adickes.
- The refusal was allegedly because Adickes, a white person, was in the company of Black people.
- Adickes alleged that a Hattiesburg police officer was present in the store at the time she was refused service.
- After Adickes and her students left the Kress store, she was arrested on the sidewalk by a Hattiesburg police officer on a charge of vagrancy.
Procedural Posture:
- Sandra Adickes sued S. H. Kress & Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The complaint included two counts: one alleging a conspiracy between Kress and local police, and another alleging Kress acted under a state-enforced 'custom' of racial segregation.
- The District Court dismissed the conspiracy count on a motion for summary judgment, finding insufficient facts from which a conspiracy could be inferred.
- Following a trial on the 'custom' count, the District Court granted a directed verdict in favor of Kress, ruling that Adickes had failed to prove the existence of a specific custom of refusing service to whites in the company of Black people.
- Adickes, as appellant, appealed both rulings to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where Kress was the appellee.
- A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict on the 'custom' count, and unanimously affirmed the summary judgment on the conspiracy count.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Adickes's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Did the lower courts err by granting summary judgment on a § 1983 conspiracy claim and a directed verdict on a § 1983 'custom' claim, thereby misapplying the standards for both summary judgment procedure and the state action requirement under the statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Harlan
Yes. The lower courts erred in their rulings on both the conspiracy and the custom counts. With respect to the conspiracy count, summary judgment was improper because Kress, the moving party, failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Kress did not submit evidence to foreclose the possibility that a police officer was in the store and reached an understanding with an employee to deny Adickes service. The burden is on the moving party to show initially the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and Kress's failure to do so meant Adickes was not required to present opposing evidence. Regarding the custom count, a 'custom' under § 1983 must have the 'force of law' through state enforcement, but the lower courts defined this too narrowly. Adickes should have been allowed to prove the existence of a state-enforced custom of general racial segregation in restaurants, not just the specific custom of refusing service to whites with Blacks. State enforcement can be proven through various official practices, such as police harassment or toleration of violence, not just through a specific statute.
Concurring - Justice Black
Yes. The trial court erred in granting both summary judgment and a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence for a jury to consider both claims. The existence of a conspiracy is a factual issue for the jury, and summary judgment should not replace a live trial where witness credibility can be assessed. Adickes's own testimony regarding the community custom of discrimination against integrated groups was sufficient to let the 'custom' count go to the jury, regardless of the precise legal interpretation of that term.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes, but for different reasons regarding the 'custom' claim. The majority's interpretation that a 'custom' under § 1983 must have the 'force of law' through state enforcement is too narrow and emasculates the statute. A 'custom...of any State' should be interpreted more broadly to include any dominant, unwritten community sentiment or practice of discrimination, even without direct involvement from state officials. The purpose of the Ku Klux Klan Act, from which § 1983 originates, was to combat pervasive social customs of racial discrimination, not just officially sanctioned ones.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Yes, but the majority's analysis of 'custom' is incorrect. While the reversal is correct, the interpretation of 'custom or usage' under § 1983 should not require state enforcement. The 'under color of' element of § 1983 is broader than the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 'custom' should be understood as a widespread community practice that is regarded as a norm, backed by community sentiment or sanctions, regardless of official state involvement. The statute was designed to combat pervasive private conduct that states failed to control, and requiring official enforcement for a 'custom' claim undermines this purpose.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified two distinct legal areas. First, it reinforced the procedural standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, placing a strict initial burden on the moving party to affirmatively negate the non-movant's claims. Second, the majority's interpretation of the 'custom or usage' provision of § 1983 incorporated a 'state action' requirement, meaning purely private conduct driven by social norms without official state enforcement is not actionable under this part of the statute. This decision narrowed the potential scope of § 1983 in combating private discrimination, a point heavily contested by Justices Douglas and Brennan, who argued for a broader interpretation aligned with the statute's historical context.
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