Adams v. Williams
407 U.S. 143 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
An informant's tip can provide a police officer with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment, so long as the tip carries sufficient indicia of reliability, such as being from a known informant who provides immediately verifiable information in person.
Facts:
- At approximately 2:15 a.m., Police Sgt. John Connolly was on patrol in a high-crime area of Bridgeport, Connecticut.
- An individual known to Sgt. Connolly approached his cruiser and informed him that Robert Williams, who was seated in a nearby vehicle, was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.
- Sgt. Connolly approached Williams' vehicle, tapped on the window, and asked Williams to open the door.
- Williams did not open the door but instead rolled down the window.
- Sgt. Connolly then reached into the vehicle and removed a fully loaded revolver from Williams' waistband, the precise location mentioned by the informant.
- After finding the gun, Connolly arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a weapon.
- A subsequent search incident to the arrest uncovered heroin on Williams' person and in his car, along with a machete and a second revolver.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state trial court of illegal possession of a handgun and heroin.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut, the state's highest court, affirmed Williams' conviction.
- Williams' petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.
- Williams then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court, which was denied.
- A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially affirmed the district court's denial.
- Upon rehearing en banc, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, granting habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the evidence was obtained through an unlawful search.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a police officer violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures by conducting a stop and frisk based on an in-person tip from a known informant who claims an individual in a nearby car is carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. An officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by acting on an informant's tip that carries sufficient indicia of reliability. Unlike an anonymous tip, the informant here was known to the officer and delivered the information in person, making them potentially liable for a false report. This reliability justified Sgt. Connolly's forcible stop of Williams. The information that Williams was armed, combined with the time, location, and Williams' failure to comply with the request to exit the car, gave Connolly ample reason to fear for his safety, making the limited protective search for the weapon reasonable under Terry v. Ohio. Once the gun was found as predicted, there was probable cause to arrest Williams, and the subsequent search incident to arrest was lawful.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. The forcible stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The only basis for the arrest was the informant's tip, which concerned narcotics. In Connecticut, carrying a gun with a permit is legal, and police have no authority to frisk a person to check for a permit. The majority's decision dangerously extends Terry v. Ohio to possessory offenses based on unverified information, and if any constitutional protection is to be 'watered down,' it should be the Second Amendment's allowance for widespread gun possession, not the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The State failed to show sufficient cause to justify the forcible stop. Quoting Judge Friendly's lower court dissent, this opinion argues that Terry v. Ohio should not be extended to possessory crimes like narcotics possession, as it risks the frisk becoming the primary objective rather than a protective incident to a stop. The informant's tip was defective because the informant was unnamed (in the record), not shown to be reliable regarding guns or narcotics, and gave no information demonstrating personal knowledge. Allowing a stop based on such a weak tip 'opened the sluicegates for serious and unintended erosion of the protection of the Fourth Amendment.'
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The majority's decision betrays the careful balance struck in Terry v. Ohio and improperly expands the concept of warrantless searches. The informant's reliability was not established; their only prior information to the officer had not led to an arrest. The officer had no personal observation of criminal activity and lacked key details about the gun or narcotics. Under Terry, an officer must have reliable information that a suspect is both armed and dangerous; since carrying a gun with a permit is legal in Connecticut, possession of a gun alone does not make one 'dangerous.' Furthermore, even after finding the gun, the officer lacked probable cause for arrest because he made no effort to determine if Williams had a permit before arresting him.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio by establishing that reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk can be based on an informant's tip, not just an officer's direct observations. It distinguishes between an anonymous tip and a tip from a known, in-person informant, holding that the latter carries stronger 'indicia of reliability.' This decision provides law enforcement with greater authority to act on tips from the public, but it also lowers the threshold for initiating a forcible stop, raising concerns about potential infringements on Fourth Amendment rights based on second-hand information.
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