Adams v. Med-Force
1996 WL 596912, 682 So. 2d 323 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
When an attorney voluntarily withdraws from a representation before its conclusion, a prior fee-sharing agreement with co-counsel is not enforceable. The withdrawing attorney's compensation is instead determined by quantum meruit, representing the reasonable value of the services they actually rendered.
Facts:
- Attorney Alan J. Green agreed to represent the Adams family in a personal injury matter for a 25% contingency fee.
- Green entered into an agreement with attorney Ernest Lee Caulfield to divide the contingency fee equally in exchange for Caulfield's assistance.
- The agreement between Green and Caulfield contemplated equal participation in both the expenses and the preparatory work for the case.
- Prior to the case's resolution, Green voluntarily withdrew from representing the Adams family because he was elected to a judicial position.
- After withdrawing, Green did not pay half of the expenses nor did he participate equally in the trial preparation.
- The Adams family's case subsequently settled for an amount exceeding six million dollars.
Procedural Posture:
- After the Adams family's case settled, a dispute arose between Green and Caulfield over the division of the contingency fee.
- The dispute was adjudicated in a trial court before a jury.
- The jury returned a verdict dividing the fee, awarding 78% to Caulfield and 22% to Green.
- The trial court entered a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict and assessed costs in the same proportion.
- Green, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an agreement between two attorneys to divide a contingency fee equally remain enforceable when one attorney voluntarily withdraws from the representation before the case is concluded?
Opinions:
Majority - Plotkin, J.
No. An agreement between attorneys to divide a contingency fee equally is not enforceable when one attorney voluntarily withdraws from the representation before the case concludes. The court held that under Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which has the force of substantive law, a withdrawing attorney's fee is determined by quantum meruit. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Scurto v. Siegrist, where no attorney withdrew or was discharged. Evidence showed Green breached the agreement by failing to equally participate in work and expenses after he withdrew to run for public office. Therefore, the jury was correct to disregard the 50/50 split and instead award Green a fee based on the reasonable value of the services he actually rendered.
Concurring - Klees, J.
No. The concurring opinion agrees with the result but frames the reasoning in terms of contract law rather than professional conduct rules. It posits that the jury found Green breached the fee-sharing agreement by withdrawing and failing to perform his duties. This breach rendered the original contract unenforceable. Without a valid contract to dictate the fee division, the only appropriate method for compensation is quantum meruit, awarding each attorney the value of the work they actually performed.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that fee-sharing agreements between attorneys are conditioned on continued participation. It establishes that an attorney's voluntary withdrawal for personal reasons abrogates the original contract, shifting the basis for compensation from the agreed-upon percentage to a quantum meruit analysis. This impacts future fee disputes by preventing a withdrawing attorney from claiming the full benefit of a contract they did not see through to completion, ensuring that fees are allocated based on actual contribution to the outcome.
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