Adams v. City of New York
837 F. Supp. 2d 108, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107389, 2011 WL 4434226 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An employer's action may not be a 'materially adverse employment action' sufficient to support a disparate treatment discrimination claim, but may still constitute an adverse action for a retaliation claim if it is harmful to the point that it could dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs were female, African-American and Hispanic uniformed correction officers ('COs') working for the New York City Department of Corrections ('DOC') at Rikers Island.
- The DOC assigned COs to either stable, desirable 'permanent posts' or to 'the wheel,' an undesirable rotating position with unpredictable daily assignments.
- Plaintiffs were repeatedly assigned to the wheel or to undesirable posts, such as those without accessible bathroom facilities, which caused particular difficulty and humiliation for female officers.
- White male supervisors frequently made racist and sexist comments, such as stating women belong 'at home barefoot and pregnant' and telling a black officer to 'kiss his lily white ass.'
- Plaintiff Monche was subjected to a pattern of unwanted sexual advances by her supervisor, Deputy Warden Olivo, over an eight-month period, which included him touching her, trying to kiss her, and disrobing in his office.
- Plaintiff Quick was summoned to her supervisor's office, where he answered the door shirtless and with his pants unzipped.
- After Plaintiffs filed internal Equal Employment Opportunity ('EEO') complaints regarding the discrimination and harassment, several were removed from their permanent posts and returned to the wheel.
- The DOC's EEO office had a policy of dismissing any complaint that lacked independent corroboration, regardless of the complaint's credibility.
Procedural Posture:
- Beatrice Adams and four other correction officers (Plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against the City of New York in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
- Plaintiffs asserted claims for race and gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII, NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The City of New York (Defendant) filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, seeking dismissal of all claims before trial.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does assigning an employee to a less desirable, rotating work schedule ('the wheel') constitute a 'materially adverse employment action' for a Title VII discrimination claim, and does that same action qualify as an adverse action sufficient to support a Title VII retaliation claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Block, Senior District Judge
No as to the discrimination claim; Yes as to the retaliation claim. Assignment to a less desirable rotating work schedule is not a 'materially adverse employment action' for a discrimination claim, but it is sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim because it could dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a complaint. For the discrimination claims, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case. Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court focused on the 'adverse employment action' element. It held that to be 'materially adverse,' a change in working conditions must be more than a 'mere inconvenience' and typically involves a demotion, decrease in pay, or a material loss of benefits. The court concluded that assignment to 'the wheel,' while subjectively undesirable and inconvenient, did not constitute a materially adverse action because it did not alter the core responsibilities or career prospects of the officers. For the retaliation claims, the court applied the more relaxed standard from Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, which defines an adverse action as anything that could 'dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' The court reasoned that the threat of being relegated to the widely disfavored 'wheel' assignment was significant enough to meet this standard. Therefore, the retaliation claims of Adams, Castleberry, Monche, and Quick, who were placed on the wheel shortly after filing EEO complaints, survived summary judgment. For the hostile work environment claims, the court found a triable issue of fact. It reasoned that the cumulative effect of the supervisors' pervasive racist and sexist comments, combined with the bathroom policy that had a disproportionately humiliating impact on female COs, could be found by a jury to be 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.' Monche’s individual sexual harassment claim also survived because the supervisor's conduct was frequent and severe over eight months. Finally, the court denied summary judgment on the § 1983 Monell claim against the City. The court found that the EEO's official policy of requiring corroboration for all complaints, which led to the dismissal of credible but uncorroborated claims, could allow a reasonable jury to infer 'deliberate indifference' to ongoing constitutional violations.
Analysis:
This decision provides a crucial illustration of the distinct legal standards for 'adverse employment action' in Title VII discrimination and retaliation contexts. It clarifies that conduct falling short of the 'materially adverse' standard for discrimination can still be actionable as retaliation if it is likely to deter complaints. The case also reinforces that hostile work environment claims are evaluated based on the 'totality of the circumstances,' allowing seemingly disparate acts of harassment and discriminatory policies to be aggregated. Finally, it serves as a significant example of how a facially neutral internal investigation policy, such as a corroboration requirement, can expose a municipality to liability under Monell if it is shown to be deliberately indifferent to protecting employees' constitutional rights.
