Adam Jaramillo Ortberg v. United States
81 A.3d 303 (2013)
Rule of Law:
The crime of unlawful entry under D.C. Code § 22-3302 (a)(1) requires proof of a purposeful and voluntary entry, and that the defendant knew or should have known the entry was against the will of the lawful occupant, without needing to establish that the defendant purposefully sought to defy the will of the lawful occupant or to violate the law.
Facts:
- On March 2, 2011, Adam Jaramillo Ortberg entered "Studio One" at the W Hotel.
- Studio One was being used for an invitation-only fundraising event for a United States Congressman.
- Mr. Ortberg entered Studio One through an exit or service door, having walked past a manned registration desk where badges were being handed out for the event.
- A sign outside Studio One identified the event as a fundraiser.
- Once inside, banquet server Kyung Quinn noticed Mr. Ortberg was not wearing a name tag and asked him if he had a badge.
- Mr. Ortberg falsely told Ms. Quinn that he did have a badge "somewhere" but needed to look for it.
- Ms. Quinn requested that Mr. Ortberg sign in at the registration desk.
- Mr. Ortberg then held up a sign he had hidden, attempted to distribute flyers, and yelled an educational message about animal rights.
- When security asked Mr. Ortberg to leave, he complied, continuing his verbal protest as he exited the building.
Procedural Posture:
- Adam Jaramillo Ortberg was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (trial court) for unlawful entry under D.C. Code § 22-3302 (a)(1).
- Mr. Ortberg, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Issue:
Does the crime of unlawful entry under D.C. Code § 22-3302 (a)(1) require the government to prove that a defendant specifically intended to defy the will of the lawful occupant or purposefully violate the law, beyond proving a purposeful and voluntary entry and that the defendant knew or should have known the entry was unwanted?
Opinions:
Majority - Associate Judge Easterly
No, the crime of unlawful entry under D.C. Code § 22-3302 (a)(1) does not require the government to prove that a defendant specifically intended to defy the will of the lawful occupant or purposefully violate the law; instead, it requires proof of a purposeful and voluntary entry, and that the defendant knew or should have known the entry was unwanted. The court clarified the mental state requirements for unlawful entry, affirming that while the physical act of entry must be purposeful and voluntary, the mental state regarding the 'against the will' element is satisfied if the defendant 'knew or should have known' their entry was unwanted. The court explicitly endorsed Criminal Jury Instruction No. 5.401, which articulates these elements, finding it accurate and precise. The court rejected the argument that specific intent to defy the owner's will or violate the law is necessary, distinguishing it from the 'general intent' to do the act that constitutes the crime. It also reiterated that a 'bona fide belief' in the right to enter, if reasonably held and based on 'pure indicia of innocence,' can be a defense, which the government must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt if fairly raised. However, Mr. Ortberg's actions—entering through an exit/service door, bypassing a manned registration desk, and untruthfully responding when asked about a badge—demonstrated that he knew or should have known his entry was unwanted, and his belief was neither reasonable nor innocent. The court further affirmed that sincere personal or political beliefs, or an intent to protest, do not provide a defense or justify unlawful entry onto private property against the will of the lawful occupant.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial clarification on the mens rea (mental state) for unlawful entry in the District of Columbia, affirming that the D.C. Court of Appeals formally adopts the 'knew or should have known' standard for the 'against the will' element. By explicitly endorsing the jury instruction, the court establishes a clear framework for future prosecutions, making it easier to secure convictions against individuals who enter private property without permission, even if they claim they did not intend to violate the law. The ruling also limits the applicability of the 'bona fide belief' defense, emphasizing that such a belief must be reasonable and based on innocent indicia, not merely a subjective claim or a desire to exercise First Amendment rights on private property.
