Adair v. United States
208 U.S. 161 (1908)
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Rule of Law:
A provision of a federal statute that criminalizes an interstate carrier's agent discharging an employee solely because of the employee's membership in a labor organization is an unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of contract protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Such a provision is not a legitimate regulation of interstate commerce.
Facts:
- The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce.
- William Adair was employed by the railroad company as a master mechanic, acting as an agent for the company.
- O. B. Coppage was employed by the same railroad company as a locomotive fireman.
- Coppage was a member of a labor organization known as the Order of Locomotive Firemen.
- Adair, in his capacity as an agent for the railroad, discharged Coppage from employment.
- The sole reason for Coppage's discharge was his membership in the labor organization.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States indicted William Adair in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for violating a federal statute.
- Adair demurred to the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional, but the District Court overruled the demurrer.
- Adair pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
- A jury found Adair guilty on the first count of the indictment, and the court sentenced him to pay a fine of $100.
- Adair sought review of the judgment of the District Court in the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the provision of the Erdman Act that criminalizes discharging an employee of an interstate carrier because of membership in a labor union violate the liberty and property rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, the provision violates the Fifth Amendment. The liberty of contract, which is protected as both a liberty and property right by the Fifth Amendment, encompasses the right of an employer to prescribe the terms upon which it will accept labor, and the correlative right of an employee to quit service for any reason. This equality of right means an employer may discharge an employee for any reason, including union membership, just as an employee may quit for any reason. The statute's attempt to criminalize this act is an arbitrary and illegal interference with personal liberty and the right of property. Furthermore, the provision cannot be justified under the Commerce Clause, as there is no 'legal or logical connection' between an employee’s union membership and the actual conduct of interstate commerce.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice McKenna
No, the provision is a valid exercise of Congressional power and does not violate the Constitution. The majority errs by viewing Section 10 in isolation from the rest of the Erdman Act, which establishes a comprehensive scheme for arbitrating labor disputes to prevent strikes that would paralyze interstate commerce. Prohibiting discriminatory discharges against union members is a rational means to achieve this legitimate end, as it fosters the stability and cooperation necessary for arbitration to succeed. The liberty of contract is not absolute and must yield to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce for the public good, a power which extends to the relationship between carriers and their employees as established in the Employers’ Liability Cases.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Holmes
No, the statute is constitutional. Labor unions and their relationship with interstate carriers are intimately and directly connected to interstate commerce, making them a proper subject for congressional regulation. The law is a 'very limited interference with freedom of contract' aimed at preventing strikes and supporting a federal arbitration scheme, which are valid policy goals. The Court has stretched the 'liberty of contract' derived from the Due Process Clause to its extreme. Congress could reasonably conclude that fostering strong unions is in the best interest of the employees, the railroads, and the country at large, and courts should not substitute their own economic theories for the judgment of the legislature.
Analysis:
Adair v. United States is a quintessential case of the Lochner era, championing a substantive due process right to 'liberty of contract' that severely limited the government's ability to regulate the employer-employee relationship. By establishing a constitutional symmetry between an employer's right to fire and an employee's right to quit, the decision invalidated early federal attempts to protect unionization. This precedent effectively rendered 'yellow-dog contracts' (agreements not to join a union) constitutionally protected. The Court's narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause and expansive view of freedom of contract in Adair would later be repudiated during the New Deal, particularly in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), which upheld federal labor laws.
