Ackermann v. United States
340 U.S. 193 (1950)
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Rule of Law:
A party's free, calculated, and deliberate choice not to appeal a judgment does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" or "any other reason justifying relief" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), even if that choice proves to be erroneous in hindsight.
Facts:
- Hans Ackermann and his wife Frieda, naturalized citizens from Germany, operated a German-language newspaper with Frieda's brother, Max Keilbar.
- In 1942, the U.S. government initiated proceedings to cancel the naturalization of all three individuals on grounds of fraud.
- After a consolidated trial in 1943, a federal court entered judgments cancelling their citizenship.
- Ackermann's attorney advised him that an appeal would cost an estimated $5,000 and that he would need to sell his $2,500 home to help cover the costs.
- While detained, Ackermann consulted W. F. Kelley, an Assistant Commissioner for Alien Control, who advised him to "hang on to their home" and assured him he would be released at the end of the war.
- Relying on Kelley's advice and weighing the financial risk, Ackermann and his wife made a considered choice not to appeal the denaturalization judgment.
- In contrast, Keilbar, whose case was based on the same evidence, did appeal his judgment.
- Keilbar's appeal was successful, and the judgment against him was reversed after the government stipulated that the evidence was insufficient.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States filed complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas to cancel the citizenship of Hans Ackermann and others.
- Following a trial, the District Court entered a judgment on December 7, 1943, cancelling Ackermann's naturalization.
- Ackermann did not appeal this judgment within the prescribed time.
- On March 25, 1948, Ackermann filed a motion in the same District Court under Rule 60(b) to set aside the 1943 judgment.
- The District Court denied Ackermann's motion.
- Ackermann, as appellant, appealed the denial of his motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, siding with the United States as appellee.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a party's deliberate choice not to appeal a judgment, made due to financial concerns and reliance on advice from an adverse party's agent, constitute 'any other reason justifying relief' from that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Minton
No. A party's free, calculated, and deliberate choice not to appeal a judgment does not qualify for relief under the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6). Petitioner Ackermann's motion was filed too late for relief based on 'excusable neglect' under Rule 60(b)(1), which has a one-year time limit. He cannot use Rule 60(b)(6)'s provision for 'any other reason justifying relief' because his situation does not involve the 'extraordinary circumstances' contemplated by the rule, as seen in Klapprott v. United States. Ackermann had counsel, had his day in court, and made a 'free, calculated, deliberate' choice not to appeal. He had no right to rely on the advice of Kelley, an agent of the opposing party, over his own counsel. The fact that Keilbar's appeal succeeded does not retroactively make Ackermann's poor strategic choice an extraordinary circumstance. There must be finality in litigation, and parties cannot be relieved from their deliberate choices simply because they turn out badly.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. The majority's rigid interpretation neutralizes the humane and liberalizing spirit of Rule 60(b)(6). The rule's broad sixth ground, 'any other reason justifying relief,' should be available here. Kelley was not a 'stranger'; he was the government official who held petitioners in custody, and it was reasonable for foreign-born individuals to repose confidence in him. The relationship between a custodian and a person in custody is akin to a fiduciary one, and the majority's reliance on technical common-law concepts undermines the rule's purpose. It is unjust to deny petitioners the opportunity to have their case heard, especially when the government admitted the evidence was insufficient to denaturalize their co-defendant in a case based on the same facts. The Court's construction hardens the arteries of a liberal rule, denying justice to those who relied on the advice of a government official.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), establishing that it is reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances beyond a party's own control. The Court drew a sharp line between a party's inability to act (as in Klapprott) and a party's voluntary choice not to act, even if that choice was ill-advised. By prioritizing the principle of finality in judgments, the ruling reinforces that litigants are generally bound by their deliberate strategic decisions. This precedent makes it much more difficult for parties to reopen judgments based on claims of poor advice or regrettable strategic choices, requiring them to demonstrate that they were effectively prevented from pursuing their legal options.
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