Abuzaffer Basith v. Cook County
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3360, 11 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 967, 241 F.3d 919 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is not required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to reallocate or eliminate what it deems to be an essential function of a job as a reasonable accommodation. Courts will give significant deference to an employer's judgment in determining a job's essential functions, which need not be tasks that occupy a majority of an employee's time.
Facts:
- Abuzaffer Basith was hired as a Pharmacy Technician II at Cook County Hospital in 1987, working in the clean air room.
- Following a 1991 car accident, Basith developed permanent physical restrictions, including being unable to walk or stand for extended periods or lift more than 10 pounds.
- The official job description for a Pharmacy Technician II, written before Basith's injuries, required the ability to walk or stand for 4-8 hours daily and lift objects weighing up to 50 pounds (later revised to 20 pounds).
- Cook County designated medication delivery and stocking as essential functions of the Pharmacy Technician II position.
- Due to his physical limitations, Basith was unable to perform the medication delivery and stocking duties.
- In May 1994, Cook County created a special assignment for Basith that eliminated the delivery and stocking functions, allowing him to work.
- Basith later filed a grievance for not being offered overtime shifts, which required employees to perform the delivery and stocking tasks he could not do.
- Basith suggested he could perform the delivery function using a motorized wheelchair but offered no evidence, such as a doctor's report, to substantiate this claim.
Procedural Posture:
- Abuzaffer Basith filed several charges of discrimination against his employer, Cook County, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, Basith filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- Basith's complaint alleged disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and retaliation under Title VII.
- Cook County moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The district court (trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of Cook County.
- Basith, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with Cook County as the appellee.
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Issue:
Is an employee who cannot perform specific job duties, such as delivery and stocking, due to physical restrictions considered a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA if the employer has designated those duties as essential functions of the position?
Opinions:
Majority - Manion, Circuit Judge
No. An employee who cannot perform the essential functions of a position, with or without reasonable accommodation, is not a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA. The court determined that medication delivery and stocking were essential functions of the Pharmacy Technician II position, and it deferred to the employer's judgment on this matter. The court reasoned that an essential function is a fundamental duty, not necessarily one that consumes a significant amount of time. The ADA does not obligate an employer to reallocate essential functions to other employees or create a new position. The fact that Cook County previously created a special assignment for Basith was an act of generosity beyond the ADA's requirements and did not serve as proof that the delivery and stocking functions were non-essential. Furthermore, Basith's unsupported assertion that he could perform deliveries with a wheelchair was 'sheer speculation' and insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the significant deference courts grant to an employer's judgment in defining the essential functions of a job under the ADA. It clarifies that a task can be 'essential' even if it constitutes a small portion of an employee's workday, provided it is a fundamental duty. The decision establishes a protective principle for employers, ensuring that providing accommodations that exceed legal requirements does not create a precedent or admission that the accommodated functions are non-essential. This makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge an employer's definition of essential functions without presenting substantial evidence to the contrary.
