Abbott v. Abbott
1877 Me. LEXIS 55, 67 Me. 304 (1877)
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Rule of Law:
Under the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, a person cannot maintain a tort action against their former spouse for an injury that occurred during the marriage. This is because no civil cause of action ever arises between spouses due to the legal fiction of their unity as one person.
Facts:
- The plaintiff and one of the defendants were husband and wife.
- During the marriage, the husband, with the assistance of the other defendants, forcibly took the plaintiff to an insane asylum.
- The court assumed for the purpose of its decision that this act was wrongful and wanton.
- Subsequent to this event, the plaintiff and her husband obtained a divorce.
- After the divorce, the plaintiff initiated a tort action against her ex-husband and his co-defendants for the assault and false imprisonment.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a tort action against her former husband and several co-defendants in a Maine trial court.
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Issue:
Does a person have a civil cause of action against their former spouse for a tort, such as assault and false imprisonment, committed during the marriage (coverture)?
Opinions:
Majority - Peters, J.
No, a person does not have a civil cause of action against their former spouse for a tort committed during the marriage. The common law doctrine of spousal unity holds that a husband and wife are one legal person, and one person cannot sue themself. This is not merely a procedural bar that is lifted upon divorce; it is a substantive bar meaning a civil right of action never exists in the first place. Divorce terminates the marital relationship but cannot retroactively create a cause of action that never existed. The court reasoned that allowing such suits would disrupt social order, leading to endless litigation over private marital matters post-divorce. Furthermore, the co-defendants who assisted the husband are also not liable, as no action could have been maintained against them at the time of the act; any such lawsuit would have required the husband to join as a plaintiff, effectively suing himself.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, establishing that the inability of one spouse to sue another for a tort is a substantive bar, not merely a procedural one suspended by marriage. It reflects a strong judicial policy of preserving marital harmony and privacy, even at the expense of providing a civil remedy for a wrongful act. This precedent significantly impacted domestic relations law for decades, forcing injured spouses to seek recourse through criminal or divorce courts rather than through personal injury lawsuits. While most states have since abrogated this immunity by statute or judicial decision, this case remains a foundational example of the doctrine's rationale.
