Aaron Reynoso v. George J. Giurbino, Warden
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22648, 2006 WL 2549944, 462 F.3d 1099 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when a defense attorney fails to investigate and cross-examine key prosecution witnesses about their financial motive to testify, such as their knowledge of and interest in a reward, particularly when the state's case is weak and rests almost entirely on the credibility of those witnesses.
Facts:
- On July 11, 1995, Jyotsna Prajapati was shot and killed during a robbery at the Top Produce Market, a convenience store she owned.
- A week later, the Los Angeles City Council approved a $25,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person responsible. The reward was renewed in 1997 and 1998.
- In July 1997, after seeing advertisements for the reward, Luis Alberto Lopez contacted police, claiming to have heard Aaron Reynoso confess to the murder two years earlier while in juvenile hall.
- In September 1997, Luis Hinojosa, a fellow gang member of Reynoso's, was questioned in prison and also implicated Reynoso, stating he heard him admit his participation at a party.
- In late 1998, after another renewal of the reward, police contacted Robert Mendoza and Javier Terrones. Both men identified Reynoso as one of two men they saw inside the store moments before the murder.
- Mendoza was a known user of crack cocaine and alcohol, had been under the influence on the day of the murder, and had previously misidentified other individuals.
- Terrones identified Reynoso only after Prajapati's husband showed him a newspaper article with Reynoso's picture identifying him as a suspect.
- No physical evidence linked Reynoso to the crime; the prosecution's case relied entirely on the testimony of these four witnesses, three of whom ultimately received reward money.
Procedural Posture:
- Aaron Reynoso was convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree robbery in California Superior Court (trial court).
- Reynoso appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court).
- While the direct appeal was pending, Reynoso filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and denied the habeas petition without providing any reasoning.
- Reynoso filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court (highest state court), which denied the petition without comment.
- Reynoso filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
- After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended granting the writ on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which the district court judge adopted.
- The State, through Warden Giurbino as appellant, appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with Reynoso as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to investigate and cross-examine the prosecution's only two eyewitnesses about their knowledge of and interest in a financial reward offered for testimony leading to a conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Reinhardt, Circuit Judge
Yes, the defense attorney's failure to investigate and cross-examine the eyewitnesses about the reward constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. Counsel's performance was deficient because she knew a reward had been offered and that two other witnesses were aware of it, which created a duty to investigate whether the two key eyewitnesses, Mendoza and Terrones, also had a financial motive. Failing to conduct this investigation and then failing to cross-examine them on this crucial point of bias was not a reasonable trial strategy, especially as counsel conceded it would have undermined their credibility. Prejudice was established because the prosecution's case was 'extremely weak,' resting solely on witness testimony with no physical evidence. The prosecutor capitalized on counsel's failure, arguing in closing that the witnesses had 'no reason' to lie. Exposing their financial motive would have provided the jury with a powerful reason to doubt their testimony, creating a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Dissenting - Trott, Circuit Judge
No, the state court's rejection of the claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of federal law, and the majority's conclusion is premature. The district court failed to resolve a critical factual dispute: whether defense counsel actually knew the eyewitnesses were aware of the reward and made a strategic choice not to question them about it. The prosecutor, deemed credible, testified that she informed defense counsel, and counsel herself declared she would not have used this information, believing it would 'dilute' stronger attacks on witness credibility (e.g., Mendoza's drug use). It is 'manifestly and demonstrably probable' that counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to focus on what she considered more fertile ground for impeachment. Without a factual finding from the district court on what counsel knew, the appellate court is engaging in speculation and cannot properly determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. The case should be remanded for the district court to make this pivotal factual determination.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the scope of a defense attorney's duty to investigate under the Sixth Amendment, particularly concerning witness bias. It clarifies that the failure to probe for and present evidence of a witness's financial motive in a case heavily reliant on credibility is not a defensible 'strategic choice' but constitutes deficient performance. The case sets a strong precedent that in 'weak' cases, such an omission is highly likely to be found prejudicial, undermining confidence in the verdict. This holding serves as a warning to defense counsel to be diligent in investigating all potential avenues of impeachment, especially when financial rewards are involved.
