A.Z. v. B.Z.
2000 Mass. LEXIS 163, 431 Mass. 150, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
As a matter of public policy, a prior agreement that would compel an individual to become a parent against their contemporaneous objection is unenforceable.
Facts:
- A.Z. (husband) and B.Z. (wife), a married couple, experienced significant fertility issues, including two ectopic pregnancies which resulted in the removal of both of the wife's fallopian tubes.
- The couple turned to in vitro fertilization (IVF), and through a 1991 treatment, they successfully conceived and gave birth to twin daughters in 1992.
- During the 1991 IVF cycle, more preembryos were created than were needed for immediate use, and two vials were cryopreserved (frozen) for possible future implantation.
- For each IVF cycle, the clinic required the couple to sign a consent form regarding the disposition of any frozen preembryos in various circumstances.
- On the final consent form from August 1991, which governed the remaining vial of preembryos, the husband signed the form in blank, and the wife subsequently filled it out, specifying that if they should "become separated," the preembryos would be returned to her for implantation.
- In 1995, as the couple's relationship deteriorated, the wife attempted to conceive using one of the two frozen vials without informing the husband.
- Shortly thereafter, the couple separated permanently.
Procedural Posture:
- A.Z. (husband) filed for divorce from B.Z. (wife) in the Suffolk County Probate and Family Court, a state trial court.
- During the divorce proceedings, the husband filed a motion seeking a permanent injunction to prohibit the wife from using the couple's remaining frozen preembryos.
- The Probate and Family Court judge bifurcated the issue of the preembryos from the rest of the divorce action for a separate hearing.
- After the hearing, the trial court judge granted the permanent injunction in favor of the husband, ruling that the consent form was unenforceable due to a change in circumstances.
- B.Z. (wife), as the appellant, sought review of the permanent injunction, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the state's highest court, transferred the case on its own motion.
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Issue:
Is an agreement between donors that grants one donor the right to implant frozen preembryos upon separation enforceable against the other donor who, after a divorce, objects to becoming a parent?
Opinions:
Majority - Cowin, J.
No. An agreement that compels one donor to become a parent against their will is unenforceable as a violation of public policy. The court first determined that the consent form was not a binding contract between the husband and wife. It reasoned the form's primary purpose was to guide the clinic, not to serve as a private contract between the donors; it lacked a duration clause; its use of the ambiguous term "separated" did not clearly apply to divorce; and the husband's act of signing the form in blank meant it did not represent his clear intent. More fundamentally, the court held that even if the form were an unambiguous contract, it would be unenforceable. Public policy, as gleaned from statutes and prior case law concerning marriage and family relationships, dictates that individuals cannot be compelled by a court to enter into intimate familial relationships, including parenthood, against their present will. Forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement, and the freedom to decide whether to become a parent outweighs the public interest in enforcing such a prior agreement.
Analysis:
This landmark decision establishes a strong public policy in Massachusetts against what it terms "forced procreation." The court prioritizes an individual's contemporaneous choice not to become a parent over a prior contractual agreement, significantly impacting the legal landscape for disputes over cryopreserved preembryos. By carving out a public policy exception to contract enforcement in this deeply personal area, the ruling signals that courts will be highly reluctant to compel parenthood, setting a precedent that will likely influence other jurisdictions facing similar novel issues. The opinion expressly leaves open whether an agreement to destroy or donate preembryos would be similarly unenforceable against a later objection.
