A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Ass'n
263 F. Supp. 3d 705 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act do not require a public entity, such as a high school athletic association, to lower competitive qualifying standards or create separate competitive divisions for disabled athletes if such accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the athletic program. Equal protection claims regarding athletic participation standards for disabled individuals are subject to rational basis review and require proof of discriminatory intent.
Facts:
- A.H., a high school student, has spastic quadriplegia related to cerebral palsy, which significantly affects his running mechanics and efficiency.
- A.H. is a member of his Evanston Township High School's swim, track, and cross-country teams, and also competes in adaptive sports for individuals with disabilities, where he is considered an "elite" athlete.
- Despite his dedication, A.H. has never been able to meet the qualifying times for able-bodied athletes to compete in the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) state track finals.
- IHSA offers separate divisions for wheelchair athletes in track and for both wheelchair and para-ambulatory athletes in swimming, but does not offer a track division for para-ambulatory runners like A.H.
- On September 26, 2015, A.H. requested that IHSA create qualifying time standards for para-ambulatory athletes to compete in the state track finals and establish a para-ambulatory division in its annual 5K "Road Race" event.
- On October 8, 2015, IHSA's Executive Director, Dr. Hickman, denied A.H.'s requests for different time standards and a new para-ambulatory division in the Road Race.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 26, 2015, Plaintiff A.H. submitted three accommodation requests to the Illinois High School Association (IHSA).
- On October 8, 2015, IHSA's Executive Director denied two of A.H.'s requests: for different time standards for the state finals and for a para-ambulatory division in the Road Race.
- On October 25, 2015, A.H. appealed the Executive Director's decision to the IHSA Board.
- On December 14, 2015, the IHSA Board held a hearing and subsequently affirmed the Executive Director's denial of A.H.'s requested accommodations.
- On February 4, 2016, A.H. filed suit against IHSA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, bringing claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Title II and Title III of the ADA, and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Illinois and federal constitutions.
- IHSA moved for summary judgment on all counts and filed a `Daubert` motion to bar A.H.'s expert witness testimony.
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Issue:
(1) Do the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act require a high school athletic association to establish lower qualifying times for disabled athletes to compete in state finals or create a separate competitive division for disabled athletes in a road race? (2) Does a high school athletic association's refusal to implement such accommodations violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - John J. Tharp, Jr.
No, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act do not require IHSA to establish lower qualifying standards or create a separate competitive division for para-ambulatory athletes because these accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the athletic competition. The court found that IHSA qualifies as a 'public entity' under Title II of the ADA and a 'state actor' under § 1983, based on Seventh Circuit precedent in `Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Asso.` and the 'entwinement' test articulated in `Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association` due to its deep connection with public schools. However, A.H.'s discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Section 504(a), Title II, and Title III) fail because he did not demonstrate 'but-for' causation; the highly selective standards exclude 90% of able-bodied runners, making it impossible to infer that his disability, rather than the high standards themselves, was the reason for his inability to qualify. More critically, requiring IHSA to lower competitive standards or create separate divisions would 'fundamentally alter the nature of the program,' which is a recognized exception to reasonable accommodation requirements. Citing `Southeastern Community College v. Davis` and `PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin`, the court reasoned that the 'essential nature' of a track or road race is to run a designated course in the shortest time, and altering the standards to make disabled athletes competitive would change this fundamental aspect. The anti-discrimination statutes mandate 'equality of opportunity and access,' not 'equality of results,' meaning IHSA is not obligated to modify competitions to ensure disabled athletes are as competitive as non-disabled ones. However, the court denied summary judgment for IHSA regarding the Road Race claim to the extent that A.H. seeks accommodations related to ensuring his safe participation, such as different start times or separate lanes, as these might not fundamentally alter the race's nature. No, IHSA's refusal to provide lower qualifying standards or a separate division does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because A.H. failed to show discriminatory intent, and IHSA's decision has a rational basis. The court reiterated that proof of discriminatory intent is a prerequisite for an Equal Protection claim, which A.H. did not provide. Furthermore, disabled individuals are not a suspect class, and athletic participation is not a fundamental constitutional right, thus subjecting the claim to rational basis review. IHSA's stated desire to maintain an integrated environment and not alter the essential competitive nature of its programs, as well as its rational distinctions for wheelchair athletes (fundamentally different activity) and para-ambulatory swimmers (different disability impact in that sport), were found to provide a rational basis for its decisions.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the boundaries of 'reasonable accommodation' within competitive athletic contexts under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. It establishes that these statutes primarily guarantee equal opportunity and access, not equal outcomes or competitive parity, particularly when accommodations would fundamentally alter the core nature of a sport by lowering performance standards. The ruling's distinction between competitive standards and safety accommodations highlights that while organizations are not compelled to change the essence of a competition, they remain obligated to ensure safe participation. Furthermore, the court reinforced the 'state actor' status of high school athletic associations due to their deep 'entwinement' with public education, a finding that extends their obligations under civil rights statutes. This decision will serve as a key precedent for future cases involving disabled athletes seeking modifications that challenge established competitive structures, emphasizing the need to demonstrate that a requested accommodation does not fundamentally alter the program while still providing for safe and meaningful access.
