A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Ass'n
881 F.3d 587 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a public entity is not required to provide an accommodation if doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of its program or service, and the plaintiff must prove that, 'but for' their disability, they would have been able to access the desired benefit.
Facts:
- A.H., a senior at Evanston Township High School, has spastic quadriplegia related to cerebral palsy and has been a three-sport athlete (cross country, swimming, track and field) since his freshman year.
- A.H. is classified by the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) as a T-36 disabled athlete, meaning his disability impairs his muscular control, balance, coordination, and range of motion.
- The Illinois High School Association (IHSA) is a not-for-profit voluntary association that organizes and regulates interscholastic high school athletic events in Illinois, including the Sectional and State championship track meets.
- The IHSA establishes demanding qualifying times for the State championship meet, which are designed to make races highly competitive and exclude approximately 90% of all runners, both able-bodied and disabled.
- A.H. cannot attain any of the IHSA's State qualifying times, and it is undisputed that even world record holders in his T-36 classification would be unable to achieve them.
- On September 26, 2016, A.H. individually requested the IHSA to create separate para-ambulatory time standards for Sectional and State track meets (100, 200, 400, and 800 meter races) and a para-ambulatory division in the annual 5K Road Race, suggesting the Louisiana High School Athletic Association's (LHSAA) qualifying times.
- A.H. also requested to use a modified starting block in some races, and his personal best times would qualify him for State under the LHSAA standards.
- The IHSA already has separate divisions for para-ambulatory swimmers and wheelchair athletes in track and field, as well as divisions for female runners and runners from smaller schools.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 8, 2015, the IHSA Executive Director granted A.H.’s request for a modified starting block but denied his requests for separate para-ambulatory time standards and divisions, finding them unreasonable.
- On October 25, 2015, A.H. appealed the Executive Director’s ruling to the ten-member IHSA Board of Directors.
- On December 14, 2015, the IHSA Board held a hearing and sustained the Executive Director’s decision to deny A.H.’s requests.
- On February 4, 2016, A.H. filed a lawsuit in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief to compel the IHSA to adopt the separate para-ambulatory qualifying times and divisions under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and III of the ADA.
- After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IHSA, concluding that A.H. could not show discrimination 'on the basis of' his disability and that his accommodation requests were unreasonable as a matter of law because they would fundamentally alter the nature of the IHSA’s track and field competitions.
- A.H. appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
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Issue:
Does the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA require a high school athletic association to create separate para-ambulatory divisions with different qualifying time standards for disabled athletes if such an accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of its competitive track and field events?
Opinions:
Majority - Bauer, Circuit Judge
No, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not require the IHSA to create separate divisions with different qualifying standards for para-ambulatory athletes, because A.H.'s requested accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the IHSA's track and field competitions and A.H. failed to prove 'but-for' causation. First, A.H. failed to establish 'but-for' causation, a requirement for proving discrimination under both statutes. This test requires A.H. to prove that, 'but for' his disability, he would have been able to access the desired benefit. The court defined the 'benefit desired' as qualifying for State, not merely having a meaningful opportunity to qualify. The IHSA's qualifying times are designed to exclude a vast majority of runners, able-bodied and disabled alike, meaning there is no reason to believe A.H. would have qualified even if he were not disabled. The fact that world record holders in his classification cannot meet the times does not establish that his disability is the 'but-for' cause of his failure to qualify. Second, even if A.H. had established 'but-for' causation, his requested accommodations are unreasonable as a matter of law because they would fundamentally alter the nature of the IHSA’s track and field competitions. An accommodation is unreasonable if it fundamentally alters the nature of the program or service, as outlined in 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The IHSA's argument is that lowering qualifying times for a new division would undermine the competitiveness of the State championship meet and Road Race. The court found that the essential nature of a track and field race is to run a designated distance in the shortest time possible, and the IHSA’s time standards underscore this essence by ensuring a certain level of competition and scarcity of opportunity. Citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the court reiterated that Section 504 does not require substantial modifications of standards. Unlike PGA Tour v. Martin, where a golf cart did not fundamentally alter 'shotmaking,' A.H.'s proposed accommodation would directly alter the core competitive standards by establishing easier qualifying times, thereby conferring a competitive advantage and guaranteeing results he currently cannot achieve. The IHSA is not required to guarantee A.H. the results he desires from existing opportunities.
Dissenting - Rovner, Circuit Judge
Yes, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA may require the IHSA to create separate divisions with different qualifying standards for para-ambulatory athletes, as A.H.'s requested accommodations would provide a meaningful opportunity to compete without fundamentally altering the nature of the competition. The majority incorrectly frames the 'benefit desired' and misapplies the 'but-for' causation test. A.H. is not asking to be guaranteed a spot in the state finals, but rather seeks the same meaningful opportunity to qualify for finals as any other runner. While able-bodied runners have a chance, however small, A.H.'s chance is zero due to his physical disability. Requiring an athlete to prove that 'but for' their disability, they would meet standards is an 'absurd pursuit' that asks courts to imagine a completely different, non-disabled version of the individual, which is a factual question that should not be decided as a matter of law. Furthermore, creating new divisions with different qualifying standards does not fundamentally alter the nature of the program. The IHSA itself has already done this by creating separate divisions for female runners, wheelchair athletes, and runners from smaller schools. If these divisions do not 'undermine competitiveness' or fundamentally alter the sport, neither would a para-ambulatory division. The essential nature of a track or road race is to run the designated distance in the shortest period of time as compared to one's peer group. Allowing separate divisions for women and disabled persons does not 'undermine the competitiveness' of a sporting event, just as allowing women in the Olympics does not denigrate male accomplishments. The cases cited by the majority, such as Southeastern Community College v. Davis, are distinguishable because they involve individuals who were not 'otherwise qualified' for the essential aspects of the program, even with accommodation, whereas A.H. is otherwise qualified to run in a track event. A.H. seeks an opportunity to compete against his peer group, which would not diminish the success of other athletes or alter the fundamental nature of the competition.
Analysis:
This case narrows the scope of 'reasonable accommodation' in competitive athletic contexts under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, particularly when the requested modification impacts core competitive standards. It highlights the judicial challenge in defining the 'desired benefit' and applying 'but-for' causation for disabled individuals. The majority's ruling suggests that modifications that adjust performance standards to allow disabled athletes to achieve results they could not otherwise achieve may be deemed a 'fundamental alteration,' even if the entity already has other separate divisions. This could limit opportunities for disabled athletes in competitive settings where a core element is achieving specific, universal performance metrics.
