A.A. Ex Rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Independent School District
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14033, 611 F.3d 248, 2010 WL 2696846 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), a school district’s grooming policy that requires a student to conceal the expressive length of his long hair, held as a sincere religious belief connected to Native American heritage, constitutes a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion unless the district demonstrates a compelling governmental interest with specific evidence and proves it is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
Facts:
- A.A., a five-year-old prospective kindergartner, and his father, Kenney Arocha, are members of the state-recognized Lipan Apache Tribe of Texas and have never cut A.A.'s hair.
- Arocha and A.A. hold a sincere Native American religious belief that their hair should not be cut unless in mourning and that it should be worn visibly long as a symbol of ancestry and connection.
- The Needville Independent School District had a grooming policy stating that "Boys’ hair shall not cover any part of the ear or touch the top of the standard collar in back."
- A.A.'s parents contacted the school district multiple times regarding A.A.'s long hair due to his Native American beliefs, requesting an exemption, which Superintendent Rhodes initially denied without explanation.
- After A.A. enrolled, Superintendent Rhodes offered a compromise: A.A. could wear his hair in a bun on top of his head or in a single tightly woven braid tucked into his shirt collar, which the family rejected.
- A.A. started kindergarten wearing his hair in two long braids and was subsequently placed in in-school suspension for non-compliance with the school's offered exemptions.
- The District had previously granted an exemption to a Muslim girl allowing her to wear a headscarf, and its policy permits female students to wear their long hair in two braids without requiring it to be tucked in.
Procedural Posture:
- A.A.'s family filed suit in federal district court (Southern District of Texas) alleging violations of A.A.'s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, rights under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and his parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
- The district court entered a temporary restraining order, allowing A.A. to return to class and wear his hair as he wanted.
- The parties agreed, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), to consolidate the trial on the merits with the preliminary injunction hearing.
- The district court found for the family on all four grounds and issued a permanent injunction against the Needville Independent School District, preventing the grooming policy’s application to A.A.
- The Needville Independent School District timely appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as the appellant.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a school district's grooming policy, which requires a Native American student to wear his religiously significant long hair in a bun or a tucked braid, substantially burden his free exercise of religion under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) when the school's asserted interests are generalized and not specifically linked to the student's exemption request?
Opinions:
Majority - patrick e. higginbotham
Yes, the school district's requirement offends a sincere religious belief and is invalid under Texas law. The court found that A.A. and his father held a sincere religious belief not just in having uncut long hair, but in wearing it visibly long as an expression of ancestry and identity, and the district court's finding of "worn long" encompassed this visible expression. The District's offered exemptions (bun or tucked braid) substantially burdened this belief because they forced A.A. to conceal the expressive length of his hair, denying him the opportunity to express a deeply held religious practice during a critical period of his development and subjecting him to official stigma or potential punishment. The court emphasized that under TRFRA, a burden is substantial if it is "real vs. merely perceived, and significant vs. trivial." The school district failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest for enforcing the policy against A.A.'s specific religious practice. Generalized interests in hygiene, safety, discipline, or authority, while legitimate in some contexts, were not compelling here, especially given the lack of specific evidence of disruption caused by A.A.'s hair and the fact that girls were permitted to wear long hair freely. The court noted that TRFRA applies the "most demanding test known to constitutional law" and requires specific evidence linking the burden to the government's interest. The District's allowance of long hair for girls and other religious exemptions (headscarf) undermined its claims of compelling interest in uniformity or avoiding disruption. The court declined to address constitutional claims given the sufficient basis under state law.
Dissenting - e. grady jolly
No, the majority incorrectly interprets the district court's finding regarding the nature of A.A.'s religious belief and erroneously concludes that the school's accommodations create a substantial burden. Justice Jolly argued that the district court's finding was solely about the belief that hair should not be cut, not that it must be visibly long. The dissent criticized the majority for "confecting" the "visibility" aspect of the belief without direct support from the district court's opinion or the common meaning of "worn." The dissent contended that wearing hair in a bun or braided, even if some length is obscured, still constitutes "visible long hair" and therefore reasonably accommodates the belief against cutting hair. The dissent also rejected the majority's argument that any restriction on hairstyle creates a substantial burden due to "stigma," stating that this would imply any regulation of religious expression is a substantial burden, which is not the law. He argued that the school's proposed "off the collar" options did not "severely restrict" the religious exercise, leaving ample room for minimally invasive regulations. Therefore, the school's policy should not be considered a substantial burden under TRFRA.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), particularly in the context of public schools and student religious expression. It establishes that under TRFRA's strict scrutiny standard, generalized school interests in discipline, hygiene, or uniformity are insufficient to justify a substantial burden on a sincere religious practice without specific, compelling evidence. The decision reinforces that courts must "searchingly examine" a school's asserted interests and the particular impact of granting an exemption, rather than deferring to broad policy goals. The ruling serves as a strong precedent for protecting religious accommodations in Texas schools, especially for Native American students, and emphasizes the demanding nature of TRFRA's compelling interest and least restrictive means test.
